Abstract. Firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous-product market where uninformed consumers search for price information. Some uninformed consumers are local searchers who visit only one seller, possibly due to high search costs or bounded rationality; whereas others search sequentially with an optimal reservation price. Equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zerodensity gap. The presence of local searchers raises prices for high-value products but can lower prices for low-value products. A reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher equilibrium prices.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking observations in consumer markets is the existence of substantial price dispersion for seemingly identical products. In his classic model of sales, Varian (1980) shows how price dispersion in a homogeneous-product market arises due to the presence of consumers who are uninformed about market prices. Price-setting …rms balance their incentives to compete for the informed consumers who will pay the lowest price and to exploit the uninformed consumers who each purchase from a randomly selected seller, producing an equilibrium price distribution. 1 The behavior of the uninformed consumers can be justi…ed as their having prohibitively high search cost to …nd the price of a second seller. Alternatively, as Ellison (2006) notes, the uniformed consumers in Varian's model can be viewed as being boundedly rational-their reservation price is set at their product valuation, which may not be optimal.
An alternative approach to understanding price dispersion is through models of optimal search. Stahl (1989) considers a model that is similar to Varian (1980) except that all the uninformed consumers search optimally given their (not too high) search cost. In equilibrium, …rms price according to a probability distribution function (much as in Varian); the informed consumers (whom Stahl calls shoppers who have zero search cost) will pay the lowest price, whereas the uninformed consumers will engage in optimal price search, sampling sellers sequentially with an optimal reservation price. An important contribution of the paper is to bridge the Bertrand equilibrium of marginal cost pricing and the Diamond equilibrium of monopoly pricing (Diamond, 1971 ) in a uni…ed model of optimal consumer search: equilibrium prices monotonically decrease in consumer search cost and converge to marginal cost when search cost goes to zero, whereas the Diamond outcome obtains in the limit when the portion of consumers with strictly positive search costs approaches 1.
While these two in ‡uential papers and the related literature have o¤ered signi…cant insights on equilibrium price competition and dispersion, 2 the startling di¤erent behaviors of 1 See also Rosenthal (1981) for a related original contribution. 2 The literature on price dispersion that originates from Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980) has come to be known as the clearinghouse approach, after the more general model of Baye and Morgan (2001) , as the uninformed consumers in the two models are perhaps best viewed as capturing di¤erent aspects of the reality: although some consumers may conduct optimal sequential search, who anticipate correctly the equilibrium price distribution and set an optimal reservation price, there may also be other consumers who behave as the uninformed consumers in Varian (1980) , searching with a limited scope. It would be desirable to incorporate these heterogeneous searchers in a uni…ed and yet tractable model.
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of oligopolistic pricing in homogeneousproduct markets with heterogeneous searchers. Each consumer demands at most one unit of the product. As in Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) , some consumers are informed and will purchase from the seller with the lowest price, while others are uninformed about market prices. The uninformed consumes will search for price information: some of whom are what we shall call global searchers, who search sequentially with recall (as in Stahl, 1989) and who follow an optimal reservation price that is generally below their product valuation; whereas the others are what we shall call local searchers, who search only once and purchase if the price does not exceed their product valuation. As in Varian, these local searchers can be viewed either as having prohibitively high cost for searching beyond once, 3 or as boundedly rational (henceforth BR) searchers whose reservation price is not derived from the equilibrium price distribution (but is rationalizable). 4 When all uninformed consumers are local searchers, our model reduces to that of Varian (1980) ; when all uninformed consumers are global searchers, the model is the same as Stahl (1989) . 5 By varying the uninformed consumers between these two types and by allowing both interpretations of the local searchers, our model combines the two approaches and provides a convenient framework to study how heterogeneity among searchers a¤ects equilibrium outcomes.
In equilibrium, there is price dispersion due to …rms adopting mixed strategies, and the nature of the equilibrium depends on how the value of the product di¤ers from a benchmarkthe optimal reservation price by global searchers if there were no local searchers, which in turn is an increasing function of the global searchers' search cost. For high-value products, for which local searchers' reservation price exceeds the benchmark by a large amount, the equilibrium is a mixture distribution, where …rms randomize between a high-price distribution and a low-price distribution, placing zero probability on an interval of intermediate prices. By adopting this clustered pricing strategy, …rms swing between targeting the local searchers and global searchers, and equilibrium prices are higher in this case than if there were no local searchers. Another interesting feature of the equilibrium in this region of parameter values is that, unlike in Stahl (1989) , global searchers may indeed search more than once and hence there is true equilibrium sequential search.
For low-value products, for which local searchers' reservation price departs from (exceeding or falls short of) the benchmark by a relatively small amount, the equilibrium has the feature familiar in the literature, where …rms adopt unclustered pricing, namely that the equilibrium price distribution has positive density (i.e., has no gap) on the entire support.
Remarkably, in this case equilibrium prices are either not a¤ected by or are lower due to the presence of local searchers. Our results thus provide testable predictions of how the nature of equilibrium price dispersion depends on the value of the product relative to search costs.
Our analysis also reveals some intriguing comparative statics. Unlike Stahl (1989) , which predicts that prices monotonically decrease as search costs become lower, in our model prices can increase as the search cost for the global searchers decreases, holding other parameters of the model constant. When the equilibrium involves a mixture distribution, a lower search cost would lower the global searchers' optimal reservation price, making it less pro…table for …rms to target them. Consequently, …rms increase the probability of choosing high prices that target the local searchers, resulting in higher expected prices in the market. Furthermore, as this search cost goes to zero, global searchers' reservation price will approach zero and they will e¤ectively search all sellers; but equilibrium price dispersion persists. In fact, in this case the equilibrium price distribution converges to that in Varian (1980) with the mass of uninformed consumers equal to that of local searchers.
Our …ndings o¤er a simple explanation of the puzzling observations that prices for many products do not seem to be lower on the Internet than in conventional markets and that substantial price dispersion remains in the Internet market, although Internet appears to have substantially lowered search cost. 6 We may consider the local searchers in our model as those who have high search cost, because they lack the access to the low-cost search technology made possible by the Internet (e.g., they may not have a computer or may not have Internet access). Then, the low search cost to …nd prices through the Internet need not reduce prices and reduce price dispersion. 7 In this sense, the "Digital Divide" not only raises an equity issue, it also has important implications for market e¢ciency. Our model thus complements other recent studies that o¤er alternative explanations (e.g., Baye and Morgan, 2001; Baye and Morgan, 2004; and Ellison and Ellison, 2008 ).
If we interpret the local searchers as BR consumers, our paper is related to a small but growing literature that models bounded rationality in the study of industrial organization. 8 As in the literature, the BR consumers in our model can have either positive or negative externalities on the rational consumers. However, in our model a relatively small departure by some consumers from optimizing behavior either does not a¤ect the equilibrium or bene…ts all consumers, including the BR consumers themselves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Sections 3 characterizes equilibrium price distribution. Section 4 analyzes comparative statics. Section 5 discusses the implications of considering local searchers as BR consumers. Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to an appendix. 6 See, for example, Baye and Morgan (2004) , Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) , and Ellison and Ellison (2005) for discussions of evidence.
7 Similarly, if local searchers are boundedly rational, the low search cost on the Internet need not reduce prices and price dispersion. 8 See Armstrong and Chen (2009) , Baye and Morgan (2004) , Ellison (2005) , Gabaix and Laibson (2006) , and Spiegler (2006) for examples of recent work, and Ellison (2006) for an insightful review of the literature.
THE MODEL
There are N 2 …rms, producing a homogeneous product with a constant marginal cost that is normalized to zero. Firms simultaneously and independently set their prices.
As in the literature, we will consider only symmetric equilibrium and assume that each …rm randomly chooses a price from a probability distribution function: if the distribution function reduces to a single point, then each …rm chooses a pure strategy; otherwise the …rm adopts a mixed strategy.
The market has a unit mass of consumers, each demanding one unit of the product.
They make choices after …rms set prices. Portion 2 (0; 1) of the consumers are informed about all …rms' prices in the market, 9 whereas portion 1 of the consumers are (initially) uninformed about prices in the market. The informed consumers will always buy from a seller with the lowest price, while the uninformed consumers will engage in price search. As is commonly assumed in the literature, the …rst search has zero cost but each additional search incurs a positive search cost. Portion 2 [0; 1] of the uninformed consumers are global searchers, who conduct optimal search sequentially with recall and with search cost s > 0; portion 1 are local searchers who will only search one seller and purchase if the price does not exceed their valuation for the product. Thus, the local searchers are the same as the uninformed consumers in Varian (1980) , whereas the global searchers are the sequential searchers in Stahl (1989) . As in Varian, there are two possible interpretations for the local searchers. They can be viewed as optimal searchers, same as the global searchers, but have a su¢ciently high search cost; perhaps because they have no access to some lowcost search technology (e.g., a computer or access to the Internet). Alternatively, these may be BR searchers, who have search cost s but have chosen their product valuation as the reservation price, which may or may not be optimal given the equilibrium price distribution.
We shall see that an attractive feature of our model is that the equilibrium price distribution will be the same under either interpretation of the local searchers. Hence we shall allow both interpretations and discuss their potentially di¤erent implications.
We assume that local searchers' product valuation is b and all other consumers' product valuation is V; whereb < b < 1 1 V andb (< V )) is the lower bound on b to be de…ned later. Hence, a special case is b = V; but we also allow local searchers to have somewhat di¤erent product valuation from other consumers. 10 The key parameters of our model are b; V; ; ; and s: A (symmetric) equilibrium is a price distribution function (p) and a reservation price r by the global searchers such that, given r; b; and other …rms adopting (p) ; it is optimal for each …rm to choosing (p) ; and given (p) ; it is optimal for global searchers to search sequentially with reservation price r:
By familiar arguments (e.g., Varian, 1980; and Stahl, 1989) , the game has no purestrategy equilibrium, and the equilibrium price distribution (p) is atomless on its entire support.
Denote the upper limit of the support for (p) byp: Then,p max fb; rg ; since a …rm will earn zero pro…t by pricing above max fb; rg : Also,p min fb; rg ; since ifp < min fb; rg ; a …rm would sell to the same number of consumers pricing higher at min fb; rg as pricing atp: Furthermore, it cannot be true that min fb; rg <p < max fb; rg ; because if it were the case, a …rm would sell to the same number of consumers pricing higher at max fb; rg as pricing atp. We thus have:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the upper limit of the support for (p) is either the local searchers' reservation price b or the global searchers' reservation price r.
Before proceeding to the analysis of our model, we discuss two of its special cases. If = 0; then our model reduces to that of Varian (1980) , where all the uninformed consumers purchase from a randomly selected seller if the price does not exceed their valuation b: The 1 0 As it will become clear later, for b V; our analysis will be entirely the same as b = V ; but b < V allows us to consider an additional case of interest. The local searchers may have lower product valuation than the global searchers, for instance, if the local searchers are low-income consumers who lack access to a new search technology, such as a computer or Internet access.
equilibrium price distribution in this case is
If = 1; then our model reduces to that of Stahl (1989) ; the equilibrium price distribution and reservation price by the global searchers are uniquely given by, respectively:
Z rg
provided that r g V: All …rms simultaneously choose prices according to c
and all uninformed consumers search sequentially with recall under the optimally chosen reservation price r g ; stopping search only when she has found a price p r g or when she
has searched all sellers (in which case she purchases from the seller with the lowest price).
and the partial derivative of the left-hand side of (3) with respect to r g is
) dp p r g dp > 1
rg dG(p; r g ) dp dp = 0; (4) r g V is satis…ed when s is small relative to V , which is assumed to hold throughout our analysis.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3), we have:
That is, if all uninformed consumers are global searchers, their optimal reservation price decreases in the portion of informed consumers but increase in search cost.
Our analysis will depend importantly on how b di¤ers from r g : We shall divide the possible values of b into three connected and mutually exclusive regions:
; whereb is the lower bound on b that we will de…ne later in Lemma 2.
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISTRIBUTION
We …rst consider the case when b exceeds r g by a large amount, or product value is high:
Proposition 1 When b > 1 1 r g ; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which each …rm prices according to mixed strategy
and global searchers adopt reservation price r f ; where t 1 < r f < t 2 < b;
1
and 2 (0; 1) and r f satisfy
(1 )
Each …rm's equilibrium pro…t is b
(1 )(1 ) N : Furthermore, r f > r g ; and F (p; ) < G (p; ) so that both the expected price and the expected minimum price in the market are higher under F (p; ) than under G (p; ) : Local searchers have lower expected surplus than global searchers, and welfare of all consumers is lower when < 1 than when = 1:
We notice several interesting features of the equilibrium:
First, the equilibrium price distribution is a mixture distribution consisting of two separate cumulative distribution functions, F 1 (p; ) and F 2 (p; ); playing them randomly with respective probabilities 1 and ; and a gap exists between the upper limit of the support for F 1 and the lower limit of the support for F 2 . Both and r f are functions of b and are determined endogenously. In equilibrium, with probability ; each …rm will price above r f according to c.d.f. F 2 ; and in doing so it targets the local searchers (and can sell to the other consumers only when the other …rm has also priced above r f ): With probability 1 ; each …rm will price below r f according to c.d.f. F 1 : Given the reservation price r f of the global searchers, a …rm is guaranteed to sell to at least 1 N of them if pricing at r f ; the upper limit of the support for F 1 ; whereas with a slight increase of the price above r f it will lose sales to all the global searchers if another …rm prices at or below r f ; which occurs with probability 1 N 1 > 0: Thus, the lower limit of support for F 2 ; which achieves the same expected pro…t as b (the upper limit of the support for both F 2 and F ); must be discretely higher than r f : when raising its price above r f ; a …rm's demand jumps down, which must be exactly o¤set by a jump-up of the price so that the …rm's expected pro…t remains the same. Consequently, an interval of prices (r f < p < t 2 ) on the support of the equilibrium distribution F will be played with zero probability. This clustered equilibrium price distribution is in sharp contrast to the usual unclustered price distribution found in the literature.
Second, in equilibrium, since both …rms will price above r f with a positive probability; global searchers may search more than once before purchasing; so there is true equilibrium sequential search. This is in contrast to Stahl (1989) , where in equilibrium all searchers only search once before purchase.
Third, the con…nement to searching only one seller is costly to the local searchers, making their expected surplus lower than that of the global searchers. This is true because of both a direct e¤ect and a strategic e¤ect. Directly, they pay a higher expected price given the equilibrium price distribution, compared to the global searchers who have a lower reservation price. Indirectly, the presence of the local searchers encourages …rms to raise prices strategically, resulting in an equilibrium price distribution with a higher expected price. As a result, the local searchers will have a lower expected surplus than the global searchers, even though they may incur a search cost in equilibrium.
Finally, the presence of local searchers exerts a negative externality on the global searchers and the informed consumers by raising the expected prices they will pay.
We illustrate the equilibrium distribution of Proposition 1 in the example below. We next consider the case where b exceeds r g by a relatively small amount.
Proposition 2 When r g b 1 1 r g ; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which …rms set prices according to G(p; r g ), and global searchers adopt reservation price r g : Each …rm's equilibrium pro…t is 1 N r g : In equilibrium, local searchers have the same expected surplus as global searchers, and the presence of local searchers has no e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome.
Remarkably, when the local searchers' reservation price exceeds r g by a relatively small amount (which can be large if is large), their presence has no e¤ect on the equilibrium price distribution, which remains to be G (p; r g ) ; same as if all searchers were global searchers. In such situations, Stahl (1989) 's analysis is entirely valid. Intuitively, even though the local searchers' reservation price exceeds that of the low-cost searchers, since the di¤erence is relatively small-either because b is close to r g or because is large, …rms' price strategy is driven by the consideration of global searchers' reservation price. Consequently, the local searchers have the same expected search outcomes as global searchers. Firm conduct and market performance are not a¤ected by their presence. The global searchers exert a positive externality on the local searchers: …rms do not want to lose sales to the global searchers by pricing above r g ; which, given that r g b; means that having the reservation price at b is equivalent to setting it at r g in equilibrium. Example 2 below illustrates the equilibrium price distribution in Proposition 2. Finally, we consider the case where b is lower than r g :
Given that r g exists uniquely, it is straightforward to verify that r h exists uniquely for any given b > 0: The result below establishes the unique existence of someb 2 (0; r g ) ; which is by assumption the lowest possible value for b:
Lemma 2 For any given < 1; if b < r g ; then b < r h < r g ; 0 < r 0 h (b) < 1; and there exists a uniqueb 2 (0;
The next result shows that if b 2 b ; r g ; then the equilibrium price distribution and global searchers reservation price are given by (13) and (14). Interestingly, when local searchers' reservation price is below r g , global searchers choose their optimal reservation price above the upper limit of the support for the equilibrium price distribution. In other words, …rms always price strictly below the global searchers' reservation price. While the …rms' pricing strategy may seem counter-intuitive, it is easier to understand once the presence of local searchers is taken into account. Since b < r h but the di¤erence is relatively small; a …rm would want to lower its price to b or below in order to sell to the local searchers-it would not be pro…table for the …rm to raise its price to r h :
Although local searchers' reservation price is below that of the global searchers', all searchers have the same expected search outcomes and expected payo¤s. This is similar to the case when b exceeds r g by a small amount. The di¤erence is that here …rms change their pricing strategy in response to the reservation price of local searchers, and all consumers are better o¤ compared to the equilibrium where = 1: So this is a case where (low-valuation) local searchers exert a positive externality on global searchers.
Example 3 below illustrates the equilibrium price distribution in Proposition 3. as having a low-value product, relative to the search cost s. From Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we immediately have:
Corollary 1 Given 2 (0; 1) ; for high-value products, …rms tend to adopt clustered pricing, randomizing between clusters of high and low prices while avoiding intermediate prices;
and for low-value products, …rms tend to adopt unclustered pricing, with a price distribution that has positive density on its entire support.
We next discuss how other parameters of the model, s; ; and ; a¤ect market outcomes.
Let r be global searchers' equilibrium reservation price, p the expected market price, the equilibrium pro…t of each …rm; w each consumer's welfare, and W aggregate consumer welfare. We …rst consider the e¤ects of search cost s.
Corollary 2 Holding all else constant:
(ii) It is possible that ; and a lower s need not reduce :
does not converge to 0; and price dispersion persists:
When b exceeds r g by a relatively small amount, the equilibrium price distribution is the same as in Stahl (1989) , and a decrease in search cost has the familiar e¤ect on equilibrium price and consumer welfare, lowering p and raising w . It is surprising, however, that a reduction in search cost can raise the expected price in the market and reduce aggregate consumer welfare when b exceeds r g by a large amount. To see the intuition behind this result, recall that when b > rg 1
; in equilibrium …rms randomize between a set of high prices targeting the local searchers and a set of low prices targeting the global searchers. As s becomes lower, the global searchers lower their reservation price, reducing the expected payo¤ from trying to sell to them. Firms thus …nd more pro…table to target the local searchers, placing a higher probability on the interval of high prices. Consequently, the expected price in the market is higher. This can lead to higher expected price for all consumers, reducing aggregate consumer welfare. 11
Price dispersion persists in our model even as s vanishes, because there are local searchers whose reservation price is b > 0; and b > rg 1 as s ! 0 (r g ! 0): In fact, as s ! 0; the equilibrium price distribution in our model converges to that in Varian (1980) with the 1 1 Since the global searchers bene…t from the lower search cost, our numerical examples show that they are better o¤ from the lower search cost, despite the higher expected price. The local searchers and the informed consumers are worse o¤ due to the higher prices.
number of uninformed consumers becoming (1 ) (1 ) : The presence of local searchers also means that a reduction in s need not lower equilibrium …rm pro…t; and for given b > 0; equilibrium pro…t remains positive as s vanishes.
Corollary 2 o¤ers an explanation of the puzzling observation that the Internet, which has substantially reduced search cost, has not signi…cantly reduced prices and price dispersions for many products (e.g., Baye and Morgan, 2004; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2006; . Our theory suggests that this can happen if there are local searchers whose reservation price is above r g . These may be consumers who lack the access to the new search technology made available by the Internet and hence their search cost remains high. Thus even as other consumers who search on the Internet have reduced their search cost dramatically, equilibrium price dispersion remains. In this sense, the so-called "Digital Divide" is not only an equity issue but also has important implications for market e¢ciency.
Next, we consider the e¤ects of changes in the portion of global searchers ( ) among uninformed consumers: Recall that the equilibrium price distribution is denoted by ( ) ;
and the equilibrium price distributions in Varian (1980) and in Stahl (1989) are denoted by ; although we have not been able to show this analytically. However, it is also possible that a higher does not lower prices, as in the case when b rg 1 .
To the extent that the portion of local searchers (e.g., consumers who have no access to computers or the Internet) may decrease over time, or may increase over time, our result suggests that as time passes, prices on the Internet might become less dispersed and become closer to marginal cost.
Corollary 3 implies that the equilibrium in Varian (1980) is a limiting case of our model when ! 0; while the equilibrium in Stahl (1989) with unit demand is a special case of our model either when ! 1.
Next, changes in the portion of informed consumers ( ) have expected e¤ects; as in the following:
Thus, more informed consumers result in lower equilibrium pro…ts. As all consumers approach to being fully informed, prices approach marginal cost and …rm pro…ts approach zero.
Finally, we can …nd out the limiting distribution when N goes to in…nite. Let (p) denote the degenerate probability distribution with unit mass at p. We have:
Therefore, as N grows large, in the limit the equilibrium price distribution collapse to the local searchers' or the global searchers' product valuation, whichever is smaller, consistent with the …ndings of Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) . Intuitively, as N ! 1; the price distribution G ( ) will concentrate at the reservation price r g because the probability of being the …rm with lowest price diminishes to zero. The concentration of prices increases the reservation price as search bene…t decreases, which in turn increases the incentive for …rms to set higher prices. As a result, r g converges to V and G ( ) converges to (V ) : 
DISCUSSIONS
Like the uninformed consumers in Varian (1980) , the local searchers in our model can have two alternative interpretations. All of our formal results in Sections 3 and 4 are valid whether the local searchers search only once because of high search cost or of some behavioral search rule. 12 We now discuss the implications of our result, focusing on the interpretation that the local searchers are boundedly rational-they have the same search cost s as the global searchers but their reservation price is not derived from optimal sequential search.
This connects our analysis closely to a small but growing literature that considers bounded rationality in the study of industrial organization. 13 From Propositions 2 and 3, we have:
Corollary 6 Suppose that the local searchers are boundedly rational in choosing their reservation price b. If the degree of departures from optimal search is relatively small in the market (in the sense that rg 1 b b ); then the BR searchers will have the same expected payo¤s as rational searchers, and the equilibrium outcome is either the same as or is better for all consumers than that when all consumers are fully rational.
Our …nding is in contrast to the result in many other models that BR consumers are always harmed by their non-optimizing behavior in equilibrium (e.g., Armstrong and Chen, 2009; Gabaix and Laibson. 2006; and Spiegler, 2006) . Unlike in these models, in our model a small degree of non-optimizing behavior by some consumers is harmless and can bene…t all consumers. Thus, BR searchers can have a positive externality on rational searchers and informed consumers.
However, when the departure from optimal search is relatively large, with b > rg 1 ; nonoptimizing search behavior is costly to the BR searchers, reducing their welfare below that 1 2 As long as s is not too large, we will have s <b b; and hence the search rule of having the reservation price at b is not irrational, but is boundedly rational, since any b 2 (s; V ] is rationalizable under some market price distribution. Furthermore, as we have seen from Propostions 2 and 3, for b 2 hb ;
it is e¤ectively optimal to choose b as the reservation price in equilibrium. of the rational searchers. Furthermore, the presence of BR searchers now exerts a negative externality on rational searchers and informed consumers by encouraging …rms to raise prices. We thus have:
Corollary 7 If the degree of departures from optimal search is relatively large in the market,
; then the BR searchers will have lower expected surplus than rational searchers,
and their presence makes all consumers worse o¤.
We have con…ned our analysis to the three cases of b > Since b is local searchers' product valuation and since V r g , it is appropriate to assume that b is not too much smaller than r g : There is another motivation to con…ne our analysis to b b : If b <b; it can be shown that the equilibrium will depend on whether searchers with the exogenous reservation price b are (i) optimal searchers with (prohibitively) high search cost or (ii) BR searchers whose reservation price is b: under (i), in equilibrium these searchers will still search only once in equilibrium; but under (ii) they may search multiple sellers if b is low. The equilibrium will still be in mixed strategies, but the equilibrium price distribution would depend on which interpretation we adopt. Our purpose in this paper is to develop a theory of equilibrium price dispersion that is robust to alternative (plausible) interpretations of consumer behavior. We thus wish to avoid conclusions that are driven by (or are only valid under) a speci…c view of consumer behavior. This is accomplished by assuming b b .
CONCLUSION
We have developed a simple search model that uni…es two di¤erent approaches of studying homogeneous-product markets with imperfect consumer information. Our analysis suggests that including the two types of searchers from Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) in a single model yields interesting new insights about oligopolistic pricing. Most strikingly, equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zero-density gap in the middle; and a reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher market prices. The equilibrium price distribution is robust with respect to alternative in-terpretations of the heterogeneous searchers. Under a boundedly rational interpretation for the local searchers, a small degree of bounded rationality in the market either has no e¤ect on equilibrium outcomes or bene…ts all consumers while reducing …rm pro…ts. Furthermore, our analysis provides the testable empirical implication that …rms tend to adopt clustered pricing for high-value products but unclustered pricing for low-value products.
While our mixture-distribution equilibrium is in contrast with the standard result in the literature (e.g., Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989 ) that the equilibrium price distribution is gapless, the existence of such an equilibrium requires certain conditions. In our speci…c model, we have identi…ed plausible conditions under which the equilibrium price distribution does or does not have a gap. More generally, our analysis suggests that the nature of price distribution will be sensitive to the speci…cations of consumer search costs as well as to other market conditions. 14 For future research, it would be interesting to extend our model to study markets with horizontal product di¤erentiation. It would also be interesting to study how …rms might separate the local searchers from the global searchers in order to engage in price discrimination. Another direction for future research is to extend our model to settings where there is information imperfection in multiple dimensions, such as in both price and product quality.
Also, it would be desirable to empirically test our model's prediction concerning how the nature of products a¤ects the nature of equilibrium price dispersions, and more generally to understand empirically price dispersions in di¤erent markets.
1 4 When the number of …rms is large, our mixture-distribution equilibrium can be alternatively interpreted as an asymmetric equilibrium where portion of the …rms price higher according to F2 whereas 1 portion of the …rms price lower according to F1: This suggests that high-price stores and low-price stores might coexist persistently, with price dispersion among each type of stores.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. We verify that F (p; ) is a c.d.f. Since F 1 (r f ; ) = 1; F 2 (t 2 ; ) = 0; F 1 (p; ) and F 2 (p; ) increase in p; it follows that F (p; ) is continuous and weakly increases in p:
Furthermore, F (t 1 ; ) = (1 )F 1 (t 1 ; ) = 0; and F (b; ) = 1 + F 2 (b; ) = 1: Therefore
Step 2. We show that each …rm is optimizing following F (p; ); given that other …rms choose prices according to F , local searchers' reservation price is b; and global searchers' reservation price is r f : The expected pro…t when a …rm chooses price p is:
because the …rm sells to
(1 )(1 ) N of local searchers with probability 1; to
of global searchers when i other …rms also price below r f (which occurs with probability
; and also to all informed consumers ( ) when its price is lowest (which occurs with probability [ + (1 ) (1 F 1 (p; ))] N 1 ). The equality above then follows from operations of combinations.
(ii) If t 2 p < b;
(1 )(1 ) N of local searchers with probability 1 and to all global searchers and informed consumers with probability N 1 (1 F 2 (p; )) N 1 (when p is the lowest price).
Equal pro…ts from (i) and (iii) yield
which, after substituting r f from (11), yields equation (7), where t 1 is given by equation (9). Equal pro…ts from (ii) and (iv) yield equation (8), where t 2 is given by equation (10).
And equal pro…ts from (iii) and (iv) yield the expression for r f ; equation (11). Note that
Therefore, the …rm is optimizing choosing prices p 2 [t 1 ; b] according to F (p; ) : Moreover, global searchers will search optimally, which gives equation (12), and the assumption that b <
Step 3. We show the existence of 2 (0; 1) : Substituting r f ; t 1 ; and F 1 as functions of and b into the left-hand side of equation (12), which can then be denoted as
F 1 (p; ; r f ( ; b))dp:
is a continuous function of ; for any given b (and given all other parameter values):
Thus, the proposed pricing strategy F and the search strategy r f constitute an equilibrium if there exists some 2 (0; 1) that solves ( ; b) = s: Since
we have
@F 1 (p; ) @r f @r f ( ; b) @b dp
@F 1 (p; ) @r f dp
@F 1 (p; ) @p dp 
there exists some 2 (0; 1) that solves ( ; b) = s:
Step 4. We establish equilibrium uniqueness. It is straightforward to verify that F is the only possible symmetric equilibrium price strategy of the game given any . The uniqueness of the equilibrium is then established if, for any given b; (b) uniquely solves ( ; b) = s;
which would be true if (b) is monotonically increasing in b: Rewriting
where from (15)
we have @A @ > 0 and
Therefore
F 1 (p; ; r f ( ; b))dp + (1 )
@F 1 @r f dp
@F 1 @r f dp > 0 from (17), and (1 )
Step 5. We show r f > r g by proving the two claims below Claim 1. r f must be monotonic in b.
Suppose to the contrary that r f is non-monotonic in b. By the continuity of r f in b, there will be some b 6 =b associated with some common r f . Suppose b >b: Then >~ from (19) and t 1 >t 1 from (9) and (11). Thus, using (15) for F 1 ,
A dp
F 1 p;~ ; r f b dp = s; a contradiction. 
(1 ) (1 ) + (1 )
Together, Claim 1 and Claim 2 imply that r f monotonically increases in b; and hence
Finally, F 2 < F 1 ; and F 1 < G because
Thus F …rst-order stochastically dominates G: It follows that the distribution of the minimum prices under F ( ); 1 [1 F ( )] N ; also …rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of minimum prices under G ( ) ; 1 [1 G ( )] N : Therefore, both the expected price and the expected minimum price are higher under F than under G; and all consumers are worse o¤ compared to the situation where = 1: Local searches have lower surplus than global searchers, since with positive probability they have di¤erent search outcomes.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given G(p; r g ); the global searchers are searching optimally with reservation price r g : To show that the proposed is an equilibrium, we thus only need to show that, given b and r g ; and given other …rms choose G(p; r g ); each …rm is optimizing choosing any p 2 h 1 1+(N 1) r g ; r g i : For any such price, the …rm's expected pro…t is
Then, the most pro…table deviation is p = b; because any p > b would lead to zero pro…t and any p 2 (r g ; b) would result in the same amount of sales as p = b but at a lower price.
However, pro…t at p = b is
Therefore the …rm is maximizing its pro…t by choosing its price from G(p; r g ); and each …rm's equilibrium pro…t is 1 N r g : Furthermore, from familiar arguments there can be no other equilibrium price distribution. The uniqueness of r g then implies that there can be no other symmetric equilibrium.
Since b r g ; local searchers always have the same search outcomes as global searchers;
and since the equilibrium distribution is identical to that when = 1, the presence of local searchers has no e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. From (14) and (3), we have
and thus r h < r g since G(p; r g ) < H(p; b) for b < r g : Also, for b < r g ; if r h b; we would
where the last inequality follows from (4). This is a contradiction. Therefore, if b < r g ; b < r h < r g .
Rewriting (14) as
H(p; b)dp = s; we have
b H(p; b)dp db
dH(p; b) dp p b dp
dH(p; b) dp p b dp <
dH(p; b) dp dp = 1: ; its expected pro…t is
Furthermore, if it prices below 1 1 +N b or above r h ; its expected pro…t would be lower than b 1 N ; and if it prices between b and r h ; since r h b for b b ; its expected pro…t would be
Thus each …rm is optimizing by choosing mixed strategy H(p; b): r g ); a marginal reduction in s reduces r from (5) and hence increases G (p; ) from (2), lowering p. 
From (12) and (9) 
Therefore, from (20), (21), and the fact that there is one-to-one match between s and from the proof of Proposition 1, we have ; then the equilibrium price distribution is either G ( ) or H ( ) ; which is independent of :
(ii)As ! 0; b > 1 1 r g if b > r g ; and from Proposition 1
On the other hand, as ! 1; we have b < rg 1
; …rms will ignore the local searchers and rg G(p; r g )dp = Z rg p 0 G(p; r g )dp + Z p 0 1 1+(N 1) rg G(p; r g )dp 
